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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH.
PlaintifFAppellee,

Case No. 920747-CA

vs.
THOMAS WESLEY CALLAHAN,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a3(2)(f) which grants original appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in criminal
cases except for those cases involving capital and first degree felonies. The defendant,
Mr. Thomas Wesley Callahan, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was convicted of a
Third Degree Felony, Aggravated Assault, a violation of Utah Code Annotated Section
76-5-103, on or about October 19, 1992.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Was Defendant's trial counsel ineffective because he failed to investigate and
interview prospective defense witnesses?
2. Was Defendant's trial counsel ineffective because he failed to subpoena defense
witnesses to testify at trial to corroborate portions of the Defendant's testimony?
3. Was Defendant's trial counsel ineffective because he failed to make a motion
for a new trial so that affidavits from Defendant's witnesses could be submitted in support
1

of that motion?
4. Was Defendant's trial counsel ineffective because he failed to object when the
prosecuting attorney asked defendant on cross examination about the specific felony of
which he had been previously convicted and/or for not making a motion in limine to
prevent such an inquiry in the first place?
5. Was the introduction of the evidence of Defendant's prior conviction improper
in that no prior determination had been made by the Court that probative value of that
evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect?
6. Was it prosecutorial misconduct for the prosecuting attorney to introduce
evidence of the fact of and the specific prior conviction of Appellant justifying a reversal
and new trial in this case?
7. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support the verdict?
The first four issues, which can be addressed together since they are merely
subparts of the larger question of ineffectiveness of counsel, present a mixed question of
law and fact. Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984).
This was recognized by the Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,186
(Utah 1990). Where no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was presented to the
trial court, an appellate court may review the record to determine on appeal whether
counsel's performance constituted ineffective assistance as a matter of law. State v.
Johnson 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18-19.
The next two issues raised regarding the admission of the specific crime of which
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defendant had previously been convicted is addressed under a standard of "harmless
error", or in other words, without the error was there a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result. Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 77-35-30 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, As amended, State V. Fontana 680 P. 2d 1042, 1048 (1984), State v.
Banner 717 P. 2d 1325 (1986).
Finally, the issue regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict is
judged under a standard of reviewing the evidence, along with the reasonable inferences
from it, in the light most favorable to the verdict and reversing only if that evidence and
the inferences therefrom are so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime
of which he was convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ECT.
1.

Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution; Constitution of Utah, Article
I, Section 12.

AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.
ART. I, SECTION 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel...
2. Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence.
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
3

elicited from him or established by public record
during cross-examination but only if the crime
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which he
was convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Thomas Wesley Callahan, was charged, by amended information, with
one count of Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated Section 76-5-103. At the close of the State's case, no motion to dismiss was
made. The prosecution called several witnesses, including the alleged victim, the treating
physician, the investigating officer from the Pleasant Grove police department, and several
private parties who witnessed parts of the altercation which led to the charges. The
defendant was the only witness called by the defense. No other witnesses were
interviewed or subpoenaed by the defense because none of the potential witnesses given
by the defendant to his attorney were interviewed by counsel. Nor did defense counsel
secure any medical evidence regarding injuries sustained by defendant in this altercation
which could have corroborated defendants assertions that he acted in self defense.
At the close of her cross examination of defendant, the prosecuting attorney asked
defendant if he had ever been convicted of a felony. The final question which was asked
was what felony defendant had previously been convicted of. Defendant's answer was
that he had previously been convicted of Aggravated Assault, (the same charge that he

4

was presently standing trial for) No objections were made to these questions by defense
counsel Nor had he filed a motion in limine to prevent such questioning prior to the start
of or at any time during the trial of this case The conviction about which Appellant was
questioned was six years old at the time of this trial and this fact was known by the
prosecuting attorney Furthermore, defense counsel did not question the investigating
officer about some pencils and a pen which defendant had told counsel were in
defendant's shirt pocket when he was assaulted by the alleged victim in this case and
which were broken or bent and knocked out of the defendant's pocket during the course
of that assault
Defendant was convicted of the offense charged by the jury Defense counsel did
not move for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New Trial Thereafter on
October 19, 1992, Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison A timely Notice of Appeal was
filed and was followed by several Enlargements of Time to file this brief
FACTS
On or about August 4, 1992, Appellant was an employee of one Carl Murdock at
Murdock's auto body and repair shop in Lindon, Utah Appellant had been so employed
for a short period of time Apparently the employer and employee were having some
disagreements over some matters related to the employment relationship and Mr Murdock
terminated Appellants employment After advising the appellant that he was terminating
his employment, Mr Murdock asked the Appellant to return a key or keys to him (R 52-
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53) Mr. Murdock had allowed the Appellant to stay in a camper that was stored on the
business premises and had allowed him to use one or more vehicles to run personal and
business errands. (R. 52, 123) A disagreement ensued between Mr. Murdock and the
Appellant over how much the Appellant was owed and over the return of a key or keys
from Appellant to Mr. Murdock. Mr. Murdock left the office where Appellant was sitting
and went into the shop area and asked the alleged victim, Steve Dickerson to come and
be with him because he anticipated problems with the Appellant. (R. 56, 72) The alleged
victim, Mr. Murdock is a young man, 24 years of age, who is six feet, two inches tall and
weighed between two hundred and twenty-five and two hundred and thirty pounds at the
time of this incident. (R. 89) In contrast, the Appellant is five feet, eleven inches tall
and weighed between one hundred and seventy-five and one hundred and eighty pounds
at the time. Mr. Murdock and Mr. Dickerson confronted the Appellant in the office and
again the keys were demanded. Appellant again stated that he didn't have the keys. (R.
55,72-73, 130-131) From that point or* there is some diversity in the testimony as to who
said what as the disagreement continued. Several points appear to not be in dispute.
Appellant left the office and went into the shop area. He was followed by Murdock and
Dickerson who apparently had his only means of leaving the shop more or less blocked
off. He picked up an iron bar approximately 12 inches long and one inch in diameter and
moved past Mr. Murdock and Mr. Dickerson to the outside of the shop and in the
direction of the camper that he lived in. Again he was pursued closely by Murdock and
Dickerson who continued to insist that he give a key or keys to Mr. Murdock. At some
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point outside the shop, the Appellant stopped next to a barrel and emptied the contents of
his pockets to demonstrate that he didn't have the keys they were demanding. No keys
were found in the contents of his pockets which were emptied on the barrel. (R. 56-60,
73-79, 134-135) Murdock left to go back inside to call the police. At this point in time
there is some divergence in the testimony as to what happened and who said what. What
appears to be clear is that the alleged victim was standing close enough to touch the
Appellant. (R. 79) When Mr. Murdock turned and walked away, Mr. Dickerson
interjected himself into the argument, ran up to the Appellant quite aggressively and the
Appellant hit Dickerson with the metal bar. (R. 104-108) The Appellant was subdued by
the other persons who were present, including initially Mr. Murdock. Shortly thereafter
the police arrived and took the Appellant into custody.
Appellant supplied his trial counsel with the identities or whereabouts of witnesses
whom he asserts could have corroborated parts of his testimony, particularly about injuries
he sustained both before and during the incident. Trial counsel did not interview these
witnesses and consequently none of them were subpoenaed to testify at trial.
Furthermore, trial counsel did not introduce the pen and/or pencils which appellant stated
were bent or broken during the assault upon him by Mr. Dickerson. Trial counsel failed
to object to the introduction of the specifics about or even the fact of Appellants previous
conviction, even though that conviction was over six years old at the time of this incident.
(R. 165) Trial counsel did not make a motion in limine to prevent such questioning.
Trial counsel did not make a motion for a mistrial based upon the introduction of that
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evidence and did not make a motion for a new trial after the verdict and judgment were
entered. Trial counsel failed to object to a number of questions posed by the prosecutor
which were objectionable or move to strike testimony resulting therefrom which was
improper.
ARGUMENT
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants trial counsel failed to investigate and to adequately prepare and present
the self defense portion of the Appellants case. He also failed to object to the
introduction of highly prejudicial evidence with little probative value regarding this case
or to move to strike the same after its admission. The failure to investigate or to
interview potential witnesses cannot be deemed to be a matter merely of trial tactics
because one cannot determine whether the testimony of a witness is helpful if they do not
know what that testimony is.
The failure to make any attempt to prevent such highly prejudicial testimony as
was introduced in this case of the Appellants prior conviction of a felony assault charge,
or to even attempt to remedy that error once the evidence was solicited by the prosecutor,
cannot be deemed anything but ineffective. The introduction of such testimony could not
have served any legitimate defense objective.
The posing of the questions regarding the Appellant's prior conviction by the
prosecutor was prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor knew of the prior conviction, its
specific nature, and the time frame it involved. Yet she did not notify the court or
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defense counsel of her intent to ask the questions relative thereto in advance or make a
motion in limine regarding those questions. The nature of that offense and the time since
it occurred rendered it of little probative value in this case. Its only possible value was to
inflame the jury and make them think the defendant was a generally violent and bad
person.
The evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict. The evidence showed that it
was Mr. Murdock and Mr. Dickerson who commenced and pursued this argument, even
in the face of Appellants withdrawal and retreat. Mr. Dickerson provoked the attack
when he charged toward the Appellant in an aggressive manner. Appellant, being a much
smaller and an older man was justified in defending himself with whatever means were at
his disposal in view of the apparent size and strength difference.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
I
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
Appellant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in a number of particulars.
The most striking of these and the most difficult to measure the effect of was counsels
failure to investigate the facts of this case and to interview the prospective witnesses
whom Appellant identified for him. Not one of these witnesses was interviewed by
counsel to Appellants knowledge. As a consequence of that, counsel could not and did
not subpoena any of those witnesses at the trial in this case. The Supreme Court of Utah
has followed the United States Supreme Courts decision in Strickland v. Washington 466
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U.S.668. State v. Bullock 791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886,
893 (Utah 1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-20 & n. 2, 124 & n.15; State v.
Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990). Strickland established and the Utah Supreme Court
adopted a two pronged test in addressing appeals based upon claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. That test is set forth in Strickland as follows:
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing
that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. supra at 687.
In cases where the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel involves a failure to
investigate the underlying facts of a case, including the availability of prospective defense
witnesses, the Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d supra at

:

"If counsel does not adequately investigate
the underlying facts of a case, including the
availability of prospective defense witnesses,
counsel's performance cannot fall within the
"wide range of reasonable professional assistance."
This is because a tactical decision not to
investigate cannot be considered a tactical
decision. It is only after an adequate inquiry
has been made that counsel can make a reasonable
decision to call or not to call particular
witnesses for tactical reasons."
The Court held in that case that because counsel did not make a reasonable investigation
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into the possibility of procuring defense witnesses that the first part of the Strickland test
had been met. It is submitted to the Court that since defense counsel in this case did not
do any investigation into the availability of potential defense witnesses, including his
failure to contact the potential witnesses whose identities or locations were provided to
him by Appellant, that the first prong of the Strickland test has been met in this case.
With respect to the second prong of the Strickland test, i.e. showing that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense, Appellant asserts that the failures on the
first prong of necessity run over to the second. That prong requires that the
defendant/appellant show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. supra at 694; See also State V. Verde 770 P.2d at 11819 n.2, 124 n. 15. Furthermore, "in making this determination, an appellate court should
consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the errors
affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the verdict
is supported by the record." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. supra at 696; State v.
Templin 805 P.2d supra at

. If counsel has failed to contact and interview prospective

witnesses how can his conduct of the defense be adequate. This is particularly so in a
case such as this where the only witness called by the defense was the Appellant himself.
In such a case, any evidence which can corroborate the testimony of the defendant is
critical since his credibility is crucial to his success. In this case all of the prosecution
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witnesses, other than the investigating officer and the treating physician, were either
related to or employed by another prosecution witness. In other words, the defendant had
no friendly witnesses other than himself Even the slightest amount of corroboration from
the other witnesses who were identified by defendant for his counsel may have been
sufficient to secure for him the benefit of the doubt in the minds of the jurors. This
failure on the part of defense counsel was compounded by his failure to object to or to
make a motion in limine to prevent the prosecution from introducing the evidence elicited
on cross-examination regarding defendants prior conviction of a felony aggravated assault
charge. Furthermore, the direct examination of Appellant demonstrates a clear lack of
preparation of Appellant for his testimony. Rather than prepare Appellant for his
testimony and conduct it in a controlled question and answer method, counsel allowed
Appellant to ramble on in an uncontrolled manner which arguably had the effect of
compromising his credibility. Counsel did not spend adequate time preparing the
examination of Appellant or preparing Appellant for that examination. In State v.
Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 1989) this Court addressed the second prong of the
Strickland test in a case in which counsel had failed to investigate, interview and
subpoena witnesses, and to prepare his client and his wife adequately for their trial
testimony. In reversing and remanding for a new trial the Court noted that "Certainly,
there can be no appropriate performance without preparation, and without preparation,
representation is nothing but a sham and a pretense. As sated in Stnckland,(cite omitted)
"the benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's
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conduct so undermined the functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 686; State
V. Crestani, 111 P.2d supra at .
II
THE INTRODUCTION OF DEFENDANTS PRIOR
FELONY CONVICTION OF AN ASSAULT
CHARGE WAS ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL
AND CONSTITUTED PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
At the conclusion of her cross-examination of Appellant, the prosecuting attorney
asked him if he had ever been convicted of a felony. Defense Counsel failed to object to
this question. Appellant therefore answered that he had. She next asked the specific
nature of the conviction. Again defense counsel failed to object and Appellant was
obliged to answer that he had been convicted of Aggravated Assault. The Court had not
previously made a determination that the probative value of any such evidence
outweighed its prejudicial effect to the defendant. Appellant asserts that given the nature
of the charges in this case, the nature of the charges involved in the pnor case, and/or the
nature of the way the evidence in this case came out coupled with his counsels lack of
investigation and presentation of potential defense witnesses, and the length of time
between the prior conviction and the trial in this case, that it was prejudicial error for that
evidence to be admitted. Regarding such evidence, Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence
provides in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking
the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
13

has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted
if elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year under the law under which
he was convicted, and the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
The Supreme Court of Utah addressed the use of prior convictions for
impeachment purposes in State v. Banner, 1X1 P.2d 1325. The Court went through a
lengthy analysis of the rule and its application in the Federal Courts and other state courts
and said:
"It is universally held that the prosecution
has the burden of persuading the court that the
probative value of admitting the convictions,
as far as shedding light on the defendant's
credibility, outweighs the prejudicial effect
to the defendant....The crime of assault with
to commit rape does not inherently reflect on
the defendants character for truth and veracity.
Instead, it sheds about the same light as any
felony involving moral turpitude." State v. Banner
1X1 P.2d supra at
The Court also addressed the factors to be considered when balancing probative value
against prejudicial effect. Those factors are:
" 1. The nature of the crime, as bearing on the
character for veracity of the witness.
2. The recentness or remoteness of the prior
conviction.
3. The similarity of the prior crime to the
charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance
may lead the jury to punish the accused as a
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bad person.
4. The importance of credibility in determining
the truth in a prosecution tried without decisive
nontestimomal evidence....
5. The importance of the accused's testimony, as
perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions
probative of the accused's character for veracity."
State v. Banner, 111 P.2d supra at
A review of these factors leads to the conclusion that the evidence of defendants prior
conviction should not have been received. The prior conviction for an a felony assault
charge does not fall within the ambit of dishonesty or false statement, and therefore its
admission can only be justified, if at all under subsection (a)(1) of rule 609. See State v.
Bruce 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989). Since the prior conviction did not involve an offense
which has any bearing upon the Appellants veracity we can next look at the issue of its
remoteness in time from the offense charged in the present case. That conviction was
over six years old at the time of the trial of this case. In State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032
(Utah 1987) the Supreme Court of Utah noted that the passage of five years since the
conviction and its complete lack of connection with the defendant's veracity required the
exclusion of the evidence.
The third factor, that of the similarity of the prior crime to the charged crime, also
weighs in favor of the exclusion of the evidence of Appellant's prior conviction. In
footnote 44 to the Banner case the Court referred to an earlier case, Terry v. ZCMI, 605
P.2d 314, at 325 wherein the Court stated:
"Consideration of the testimony's prejudicial
effect is especially pertinent when the
witness is the defendant in a criminal prose15

cution ... This is particularly important when,
as here, the prior conviction is for the same
type of crime involved in the matter under
present consideration. In this type of situation,
the probative value of the evidence as affecting
the party's credibility will rarely outweigh the
resulting confusion of the issues in dispute and
the prejudice to the party."
A consideration of the fourth and fifth factors also demonstrate that the prior
conviction should not have been received. The decisive issues in this case did not turn
upon whether the defendant struck Mr. Dickerson with the pipe. Rather they involved
issues of who was the aggressor and the defendant's claims of self defense. The transcript
reveals that only three people witnessed in any fashion the blow received by Mr.
Dickerson as it was delivered, Mr. Dickerson, the Appellant, and Dennis Gray. Mr.
Dickerson testified that he tried to grab the metal bar to prevent the defendant from
striking Mr. Murdock who had turned and was walking away from their location. He also
testified that he did not make any aggressive moves toward the Appellant just prior to that
blow being struck. Mr. Gray testified that just prior to the blow being struck that Mr.
Dickerson ran up to Appellant in an aggressive manner. Appellant testified that he
essentially acted to defend himself. Under those circumstances the introduction of
evidence of a conviction of the same type of offense could serve no purpose other than to
inflame the jury and as the third factor indicates," to punish the accused as a bad person."
In reviewing this question the Court must determine whether the admission of the
prior conviction was "harmless error." That determination is made by questioning
whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in the
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absence of the error. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1032 (Utah 1987); State v. Knight,
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986). A
reasonable likelihood exists "when the reviewing court's confidence in the outcome is
eroded; this erosion occurs at some point between a "mere possibility" and a "probability"
of a different outcome." State v. Knight 13A P.2d 913, 920; State v. Bruce 779 P.2d 646,
(see dissenting opinion of Justice Zimmerman.)
Appellant also asserts that in addition to the above errors involved in the admission
of his prior conviction, that the offering of that evidence constituted prosecutorial
misconduct. As the Supreme Court of Utah observed in State v. Emmett, Docket No.
910077 (Utah 1992) "A prosecuting attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he(she)
is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. (S)he may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor—indeed, (s)he should do so. But, while (s)he may strike hard blows, (s)he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his (her) duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one." It is submitted that in view of all of the circumstances of this case, that
the conduct of the prosecuting attorney introducing the prior conviction cannot be
countenanced. It is a hollow exercise to speak out against such tactics and yet allow the
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fruits of their use to stand because they are deemed to be "harmless." Until they are
reviewed under a more stringent standard there is little, if any, reason for prosecutors to
stop using such tactics. It is submitted that the conviction should be reversed and the
case remanded with instructions that the prior convictions not be admitted and the
prosecuting attorney sanctioned for offering the evidence before the evidentiary findings
for its use required by Rule 609 had been made by the trial judge.
Ill
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE JURIES VERDICT
Appellant contends, as his final point, that the evidence was insufficient to support
the verdict against him. In reviewing a verdict on this ground the court's power is
somewhat limited. The Court views the evidence along with the reasonable inferences
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict. The court will reverse on the evidence
so viewed, is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191-192 (Utah 1987); State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,
444 (Utah 1983); State v. Moore 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990). Appellant asserts that
given the state of the record in this case, including the size and age differential between
appellant and the alleged victim, the fact that appellant was obviously attempting to
retreat from a highly emotionally charged confrontation, and the victims observed
aggressive behavior toward appellant, that reasonable minds must have concluded that
appellant reasonably believed that he needed to use the force he used to protect himself
18

from an attack by a much younger, larger, and stronger man. Under these circumstances,
appellant should not be put in the position of risking a serious beating at the hands of
such an individual or being charged and convicted of this kind of an offense. In view of
the size and age differences appellant asserts that he would have been foolish indeed to
have attempted to defend himself from such advances with his bare hands only.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, appellant urges upon this court that he did not receive a fair trial in
view of all the circumstances of this case. His trial counsel did not adequately investigate
or prepare his defense. He did not even adequately prepare Appellant for his testimony.
He did not object when the prosecuting attorney offered evidence of Appellants prior
felony conviction of a similar charge. As the United States Supreme Court noted in
Holloway v. Arkansas 435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1181 (1978) the right to
effective assistance of counsel is "so basic that its infraction can never be treated as
harmless error." For this reason alone, the conviction should be reversed and a new trial
ordered for Appellant. But this is not the only error that was made. The introduction of
the prior conviction under the circumstances of this case was so prejudicial as to deny
Appellant a fair trial. The prosecuting attorney took advantage of Appellant's trial
counsels inept performance. There was absolutely no finding by the trial court that the
probative value of that prior conviction outweighed its prejudicial effect to appellant. In
view of the nature of that conviction and its remoteness in time, it had little, if any,
bearing on Appellant's veracity and could serve no legitimate purpose other than to
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prejudice the jury against Appellant. When coupled with the preparation and performance
of Appellant's trial counsel the outcome was that Appellant did not receive a fair trial.
Finally, Appellant asserts that under the facts, even as meagerly as they were
developed in this case, that the evidence established that Appellant was justified in using
the force that he used in this case. He repelled what appeared to him to be an imminent
attack by a much younger, larger, and stronger man rather than submit himself to a
beating which he could not repel with his bare hands only.
It is Appellants request that the Court reverse the judgment of conviction entered
against him and return this matter to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment
of not guilty or in the alternative that the Court reverse the judgment entered against
Appellant and remand the matter for a new trial where Appellant can be assisted by
effective counsel and present the witnesses he has to corroborate his testimony and where
the prejudicial evidence erroneously admitted in this case can be properly excluded.

DATED:

March^ , 1993
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
RASMUSSEN AND GREEN

Attorney's foi/Appellant
THOMAS WESLEY CALLAHAN
appeal; call
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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MINUTE ENTRY

THE STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NUMBER:

Plaintiff,

921400363

vs.

DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1992

THOMAS WESLEY CALLAHAN,

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

Defendant.

Rept: Creed Barker, CSR
kkk-kkkkkkkkk

This
hearing.

matter

came before

the Court

for a sentencing

The State appeared by and through Deputy County Attorney

Claudia Laycock.

The defendant was present and represented by

Craig Bainum.
Mr.
defendant.

Bainum

addressed

the

Court

in

behalf

'

of the

The State responded.
The defendant having been found Guilty by a jury to the

offense of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony, now present
in court and represented by counsel, and there being no legal
reason why sentence should not be imposed, is hereby sentenced as
follows:
SENTENCE
The defendant is sentenced to be confined in the Utah
State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed five (5)

^

years.
CUSTODY REMAND
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Utah
County Jail to be transported to the Department of Corrections to
commence serving the sentence immediately.
RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 77-27-13(5) the Court
provides the following information:
(1)
The Court is of the opinion that the defendant
should be imprisoned for a term prescribed by the Utah Sentence and
Release Guidelines.
(2) The Court has no information regarding the character
of the defendant or any mitigating or aggravating circumstance
connected with the offense for which the defendant was convicted
other than those set forth in the Adult Probation & Parole report.
(3)
For the defendant to receive credit for the time
already served for this case.
(4) As a condition of parole, the defendant is to pay
restitution in the amount of $89.

cc:

Carlyle K. Bryson, Esq.
Craig Bainum, Esq.
Adult Probation & Parole
Utah County Jail
Utah State Prison

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
***********

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER: 921400368
vs.
THOMAS WESLEY CALAHAN,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Defendant.
************

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
INSTRUCTION NO. 1
It is the duty of the court to instruct you in the law that
applies to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to follow the
law as the court states it to you, regardless of what you
personally believe the law is or ought to be.

On the other hand,

it is your exclusive province to determine the facts in the case,
and to consider and weigh the evidence for that purpose.
The authority thus vested in you is not an arbitrary power,
but must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound
discretion, and in accordance with rules of law stated to you.

INSTRUCTION NO, 2
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah
against defendant, Thomas Calahan, in which defendant is accused
by the Information of the commission of the crime of:
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 7 6-5103 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that he on or about
August 4, 1992, in Utah County, Utah, did knowingly and
intentionally or recklessly attempt, with unlawful force or
violence to do bodily injury to another by use of a dangerous
weapon, to wit: a metal bar; or did knowingly and intentionally
or recklessly, threaten, accompanied by a show of immediate force
or violence, to do bodily injury to another by use of a dangerous
weapon, a metal bar; or did knowingly and intentionally or
recklessly commit an act with unlawful force or violence that
caused or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another
by use of a dangerous weapon, a metal bar.
When the defendant was arraigned on this charge defendant
entered a plea of not guilty, which plea casts upon the State the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the essential
elements of the crime charge, which are set forth in Instruction
No. 3 .
The foregoing is not to be regarded as a statement of the
facts proved in this case, but it is to be considered merely as a
summarized statement of the accusation against defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO, 3
The essential elements of the crime charged in the
Information, Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony, are as
follows:
1.

That the defendant, Thomas Calahan, on or about August

4, 1992, in Utah County, Utah;
2.

Assaulted Steven Dickerson in that he intentionally,

knowingly, or recklessly either:
(a)

attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to do
bodily injury to Steven Dickerson; OR

(b)

threatened, accompanied by a show of immediate
force or violence, to do bodily injury to Steven
Dickerson; OR

(c)

committed an act, with unlawful force or violence,
that caused or created a substantial risk of
bodily injury to Steven Dickerson;

3.

That in committing an assault as defined above, the
defendant either:
(a)

intentionally caused serious bodily injury to
Steven Dickerson; OR

(b)

used a dangerous weapon or other means or force
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.

If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond
a reasonable doubt any one or more of the above essential

elements of the crime charged, you must find the defendant not
guilty of the crime charged.

On the other hand, if the State has

proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of
the offense as above set forth, then you should find the
defendant guilty of the charge.

INSTRUCTION NO. 4
A person engages in conduct intentionally with respect to
the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it
is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.

INSTRUCTION NO. 5
Intent and motive should never be confused.
prompts a person to act, or fail to act.

Motive is what

Intent refers only to

the state of mind with which the act is done or omitted.
Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not
be proven.

The motive of the accused is immaterial except

insofar as evidence of motive may aid in a determination of state
of mind or intent.

INSTRUCTION NO. 6
A person engages in conduct knowingly with respect to
his conduct or to circumstance surrounding his conduct when he is
aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause
the result.

INSTRUCTION NO. 7
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct
recklessly, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct
or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or that the result will occur.

The risk must

be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor's standpoint.

INSTRUCTION No. 8
You are instructed that "bodily injury" means physical pain,
illness, or any impairment of physical condition.

INSTRUCTION No. 9
"Serious bodily injury" means any bodily injury which
creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted
loss or impairment of a function of any bodily member or organ,
or creates a substantial risk of death.
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INSTRUCTION NO, 11
The crime of Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor, is a lesser
included offense to the crime of Aggravated Assault, a Third
Degree Felony.

In considering the offense it is your duty to

first determine from the evidence in this case whether or not the
Defendant is guilty of the crime charged in the information,
Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony.

If you are convinced

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of
Aggravated Assault then you should so find and disregard the
lesser included offense of Assault.
If you determine that the Defendant did not commit, the crime
charged in the information, then you shall consider whether or
not he committed the lesser included offense of Assault.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13
A person is justified in threatening or using force against
another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that
such force is necessary to defend himself or a third person
against such other's imminent use of unlawful force; however, a
person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury only if he reasonably
believes that the force is necessary to prevent death or serious
bodily injury to himself or a third person, or to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony.
A person is not justified in using force under the
circumstances specified in the preceding paragraph if he:
a.

initially provokes the use of force against himself with

the intent to use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm on
the assailant; or
b.

is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after

the commission or attempted commission of a felony; or
c.

was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by

agreement, unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively
communicates to such other person his intent to do so and the
other notwithstanding continues or threatens to continue the use
of unlawful force.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15
The defendant is not required to testify in his own
behalf.

The law expressly gives him the privilege of not

testifying if he so desires.

The fact that he has not taken the

witness stand must not be taken as any indication of his guilt,
nor should you indulge in any presumption or inference adverse to
him by reason thereof.

The burden remains with the state,

regardless of whether the defendant testifies in his own behalf
or not, to prove by the evidence his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 17
Evidence consists of testimony of witnesses, writings,
material objects, or anything presented to the senses amd offered
to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact.
Evidence is either direct or circumstantial.
Direct evidence is evidence that directly proves a
fact, without the necessity of an inference, and which by itself,
if found to be true, establishes that fact.
Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to
be true, proves a fact from which an inference of the existence
of another fact may be drawn.

And it is a deduction of fact that

may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group
of facts established by the evidence.
It is not necessary that facts be proved by direct
evidence.

They may be proved also by circumstantial evidence or

by a combination of direct evidence and circumstantial evidence.
Both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are acceptable
as a means of proof.
than the other.

Neither is entitled to any greater weight
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19
If the Court has said or done anything which has suggested
to you that it is inclined to favor the claims or positions of
either party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by
such a suggestion.

Do not assume that I hold any opinion on the

matters to which I have addressed any comment, remark or inquiry.
Neither in these instructions nor in any ruling, action, or
remark that I have made during the course of this trial have I
intended to interpose any opinion or suggestion as to how I would
resolve any of the factual issues of this case.
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20

"s -^resumed to b^

innocent

IT T . . . such person Is proved
?he presumptLor

.-in

n

nce is : t

T ::
..lie Idw J si<a .

-

,>. lUt.j^ up .1,

*
,. •-

* ner

substantial
irv,

"

•jmane provision OL the !a',v, . ntended, sc
••

* -r

•.; oe disregarded
^s?erri.a^ la r+ of
i

i a - «s human agency i~

• * oi an innucenc persoii being

\-\ lusr L\ p u m s n e d .
j.n^ presumption nt- i npnrpncr must continue to prevai] in the
mindc; r
reasonable doubr or ::ie qui it-

.he defendant-

., ^s^

i a

reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, such defendant is
er. c- t .. eJ* u

an acqu i 11a 1.

INSTRUCTION NO. 21
The term "reasonable doubt" means doubt based on reason and
common sense; it is doubt for which a reason can be given based
upon the evidence.
A "reasonable doubt" must be a doubt which, without being
sought after, fairly and naturally arises from all the evidence
or lack of evidence.

A "reasonable doubt:" is a doubt which is

real, and which does not arise from sympathy or from one's
imagination.
If after impartial consideration and comparison of all the
evidence in the case you can honestly say that you are not
convinced of the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt.
If on the other hand after consideration and comparison of all
the evidence in the case you can honestly say that you are firmly
convinced of the defendant's guilt, the defendant's guilt has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a reasonable

doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty.

Jc

3 y* ,

: .*

i; fur:r

:ons\,^z

- i

so without: violence \^ . ..ui ..-A. < . >
(
.
•
*
* :~ the ca?°

Pny

" ^nr-^^i *

,-j

*i~h 3ne another and to

*a—»ome"

^ou car do

u^^raer;

ii'.l

,j ; j « : ~, :ni / after i

L.nsiderat^ ^

should

ran hesitate *
1

;nange ir opinion IL cunv.nceu
wever, * " , *'* ^

' ** x" rir*-pn{jpr

,di

-

our nones-:

.:owict.^uo ^oncerniric * . . .
''^re purpose of returnma a verdj r~

solely because of t'.he

INSTRUCTION NO, 23
You are the sole judges of the weight of the evidence, the
credibility of the witnesses and the facts.

In considering the

testimony of a witness you may consider his appearance and
demeanor, his apparent frankness and candor, or the want of it;
his opportunity to observe, his ability to understand, and his
capacity to remember; you may consider the interest, if any is
shown, which any witness may have in the result of the trial; and
also any bias he or she may have, or any motive or probable
motive which any witness may have to testify for or against
either party.
If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely,
as to any material fact in the case, you are at liberty to
disregard the whole of the testimony of such witness, except for
portions of the testimony that may have been corroborated by
other credible witnesses or credible evidence.

You are not bound

to believe all that the witnesses may have testified to nor are
you bound to believe any witness; you may believe one witness
against many, or many as against one.

In the light of the above

observations, it is your privilege to judge the weight to be
given the testimony of the witnesses and to determine what the
facts are.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their
deliberations are a matter of considerable importance.

It is

rarely productive of good for a juror, upon entering the jury
room, to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the case or to
announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict.

When

one does that at the outset, one's sense of pride may be aroused,
and one may hesitate to recede from an announced position if
shown that it is fallacious.

Remember that you are not partisans

or advocates in this matter, but are judges.

The final test of

the quality of your service will lie in the verdict which you
return to the court, not in the opinions any of you may hold as
you retire to deliberate.

Have in mind that you will make a

definite contribution to efficient judicial administration if you
arrive at a just and proper verdict.

To that end, the court

would remind you that in your deliberations in the jury room
there can be no triumph excepting the ascertainment and
declaration of the truth and the administration of justice based
thereon.

INSTRUCTION ""

26

"If i! becomes necessary u m communicate with the: court, yon may se;..:
signed b" your foreperson, n
} If'o • nc

•

court

.:\ a n /

: _ b, I

::v ne o» m re members

r the jur" ",

*" .r "~i*" .re.un^ uLhei

^ ^ Q r communicate

•:rihy

Mir deliberation^ *
*
•

here

;r

open

Bear m

Liia,

*/ith

A J.^UCU

ir." member of

,ie court

1

the

.,tn the

arv

v

any

subject

;ci,r r .

* ••

-* ;; <> 0 1 i a r e never

person—not PVPII

or otherwise, jnti 1 _^- -:ave reached a verdict.

t o revea ] t o any

INSTRUCTION NO. 27
In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss
nor consider the subject of penalty or punishment, as that is a
matter which lies with the court, and other court proceedings.
The penalty and punishment for the crime charged must not in any
way affect your decision as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO. 28
When you retire to deliberate, you will select one of your
members as foreperson, who will preside over your deliberations.
Your verdict must be in writing, signed by your foreperson, and
when found must be returned by you into this Court.
I will provide you with four blank verdict forms.

When you

have agreed upon your verdict, your foreperson should sign the
appropriate verdict form or forms and notify the officer having
you in charge, who will conduct you into Court.
This being

a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all

jurors is required to find a verdict.
As to the charge of Aggravated Assault your verdict must be
either:
(A)

Guilty of Aggravated Assault as contained in the

Information, or
(B)

Not Guilty of Aggravated Assault.

If you find the Defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault you
should not consider the lesser included offense and may therefore
disregard the verdict forms that correspond to the lesser
included offense.
If you find the Defendant not guilty of Aggravated Assault,
you must return the appropriate not guilty verdict form, signed
by your foreman, to the Court.

You must then also consider the

lesser included offense of Assault.

As to the lesser included

offense of Assault, your verdict must be either:
(A)

Guilty of Assault, or

(B)

Not Guilty of Assault.

If you find the Defendant guilty of Assault, you should
return a signed copy of the guilty verdict form corresponding to
Assault, together with the not guilty verdict form corresponding
to the Aggravated Assault charge, to the court.

Similarly, if

you find the Defendant not guilty of Assault, you should return a
signed copy of the not guilty verdict form corresponding to
Assault, together with the not guilty verdict form corresponding
to the Aggravated Assault charge, to the court.
You may take these instructions with you to the jury room
for further consideration.
Instructions numbered from 1 through 19 given to the Jury
this 4th day of February, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Ray M. Harding Judge

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
***********

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER: 921400368
vs.
THOMAS WESLEY CALAHAN,

JURY VERDICT

Defendant.
************

We, the Jury impaneled in the above entitled cause, find the
defendant NOT GUILTY of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree
Felony.
DATED this 14th day of September, 1992.

Jury Foreperson

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
***********

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER: 921400368
vs.
THOMAS WESLEY CALAHAN,

JURY VERDICT

Defendant.
************

We, the Jury impaneled in the above entitled cause, find the
defendant GUILTY of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony.
DATED this 14th day of September, 1992.

Jury Foreperson

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
***********

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER: 921400368
vs.
THOMAS WESLEY CALAHAN,

JURY VERDICT

Defendant.
************

We, the Jury impaneled in the above entitled cause, find the
defendant NOT GUILTY of Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor.
DATED this 14th day of September, 1992.

Jury Foreperson

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

•

*

*

*

*

*

*

'

*

*

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER: 921400368
vs.
THOMAS WESLEY CALAHAN,

JURY VERDICT

Defendant.
-k-k-k-k-k-k-kJc-k-kJelc

We, the Jury impaneled in the above entitled cause, find the
defendant GUILTY of Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor.
DATED this 14th day of September, 1992.

Jury Foreperson

